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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Genetic health is a confusing but increasingly important cultural 
construct. A little over a decade ago, I delineated the difference be-
tween a social or relational definition of health, which is embedded in 
any given society’s basic beliefs about the nature of illness and death, 
and a biological conception of health and illness as the absence of 
disease.1 The growing prevalence of genetic explanations for disease 
means our contemporary concept of biological health includes the 
idea of an individual’s risk of disease or even death. A genetic defini-
tion of health thus incorporates the idea of the absence of the risk of 
illness processes, not necessarily in ourselves, but in those to whom 
we are genetically related. The goal of “genetic medicine”—if we start 
to use that term—would be to reduce or eliminate the genetic risks to 
health.2 Ironically, genetic health is the ultimate notion of a rela-
tional concept of health because the risk of disease or ill health is not 
individual, but social. Thus, the concept of genetic health—or in its 
negative form, “genetic disease or defect”—always involves a social 
unit: the family, a couple contemplating having children, an individ-
ual planning single parenthood, or an ethnic or geographically de-
                                                                                                                    
 * ©2002 by Larry I. Palmer, Institute for Bioethics, Health Law & Policy, Univer-
sity of Louisville School of Medicine. A.B., Harvard; LL.B., Yale University. I wish to thank 
Matthew R. Rawlings, Class of 2004, Cornell Law School, for his assistance with the foot-
notes.  
 1. See LARRY PALMER, LAW, MEDICINE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 10-11 (1989).  
 2. At present, “gene therapy” only reduces risk rather than provides a “cure” in the 
traditional sense of medicine’s goals. Gene therapy interventions are fairly labeled “ex-
perimental.” Cf. Daniel S. Greenberg, Stricter Regulation Proposed for U.S. Gene-Therapy 
Trials, LANCET, June 3, 2000, at 1977 (describing initial heightened regulatory response to 
death of 18-year-old Jesse Gelsinger during gene therapy research trial at University of 
Pennsylvania). 
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fined group. Let me illustrate this point with a bit of personal his-
tory. 
A.   A Narrative 
 When my youngest son, Reid, was in utero in 1982, his mother’s 
physician informed us that the routine blood tests he had ordered in-
dicated an antibody reaction that was troublesome. After consulting 
with several specialists, we had a diagnosis—a genetic incompatibil-
ity between Reid’s blood and his mother’s blood that created risks of 
stillbirth or elevated bilirubin3 at birth. After he was born he became 
jaundiced and blood tests indicated high levels of bilirubin with risks 
of mental retardation, physical impairments, or death.4 After a com-
plete blood transfusion and ten days in the special care nursery, he 
was able to come home.  
 Reid’s condition at birth—“little C/big C incompatibility on the RH 
factor”—is extremely rare. Even twenty years ago, health care practi-
tioners knew that the more familiar RH factor was really a matter of 
three different genes.5 The hemoglobin shot usually given to mothers 
with the RH factor did not deal with the C gene problem.6 Reid’s pe-
diatrician advised us that bilirubin problems tended to get worse 
with each subsequent pregnancy. He hypothesized that the mild 
jaundice we saw in our first child, Barry, might have been caused by 
the same incompatibility. Since Reid was our third child, he advised 
us to consider the consequences of having more children.  
 Fortunately, there were no disability issues to confront with Reid 
due to the genetic mismatch between his mother and myself. Reid is 
a healthy 20-year-old college junior. At some point I will have to talk 
to Reid and his two older brothers about the genetic risks that they 
may have inherited from their biological parents. At the very least, 
they and any prospective mates are entitled to know what I discov-
ered in 1982, and any new knowledge that might be available in the 
                                                                                                                    
 3. “[A] reddish bile pigment . . . resulting from the degradation of heme . . . in the 
liver: a high level in the blood produces the yellow skin symptomatic of jaundice.” RANDOM 
HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 207 (2d ed. 1999).  
 4. Kernicterus is the medical term for the condition when the breakdown of red blood 
cells caused by the concentration of bilirubin occurs in newborns. See “For Prevention and 
Promise,” Parents of Infants and Children with Kernicterus, available at http://www. 
bilirubin.net (last visited Aug. 25, 2002) (on file with author); see also K. Carter, Kernic-
terus in Full-Term Infants—United States, 1994-1998, in 50 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY 
WEEKLY REPORTS 491-94 (2001), available at http://www.cdc. 
gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5023.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2002) (on file with author).  
 5. For a description of the disease caused by blood incompatibility problems between 
mother and infant, see Jayashree Ramasethu & Naomi L.C. Luban, Alloimmune Hemolytic 
Disease of the Newborn, in WILLIAMS HEMATOLOGY 665-75 (Ernest Beutler et al. eds., 6th 
ed. 2001).  
 6. Id. 
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Human Genome Era7 about the risks of stillbirth, disability, or death 
in their progeny. I live with the implications of notions of “genetic 
health” for me and my three sons. As genetic knowledge grows, the 
number of families coping with genetic risks and emerging notions of 
genetic health will increase.8 To put the point another way, genetic 
health makes us think of illness, disease, and death in terms of re-
productive partners, who our parents were, and our memberships in 
various ethnic, social, or even geographical groups.9  
B.    The Genetic Health of the Society: Eugenics 
 The ethical and legal risks of using a concept of genetic health in 
social decisions is captured by the term “eugenics,” the idea that cer-
tain individuals are genetically too risky for the society to tolerate. 
Eugenics has bad—even “evil”—social connotations. No respectable 
scientist today would endorse eugenics. The mainstream mantra of 
the Human Genome Era, however, is that there is really only one 
“race” of any biological significance, the “human race.”10 Although the 
study of ethical, social, and legal aspects of genetic advancement was                    
made a part of the Human Genome Project11—scientists seem to be 
saying, “Let us get on with the job of helping health care profession-
als develop new ways of managing disease processes. Health care 
professionals can be trusted to implement these new genetic treat-
ment modalities in accordance with prevailing legal doctrines and 
ethical standards respecting individual autonomy.” Our culture, 
however, has a long history of eugenic practices and genocides that 
were not recognized by cultural, social, and legal institutions as such 
until long after the practices have taken place.12  
 To take the most infamous of these practices, the Nazi experi-
ments on concentration camp inmates were not the work of a few 
                                                                                                                    
 7. Defined as “[a] period in which biomedical research will be dominated by the as-
sumption that genetic knowledge will improve health care delivery and presumably overall 
health status—not only in this country, but throughout the world.” Larry I. Palmer, Dis-
ease Management and Liability in the Human Genome Era, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002). 
 8. The interest in the incompatibility on the C gene in the RH factor as it relates to 
different groups is apparently growing. See Sabeena Setia et al., Neonatal Jaundice in 
Asian, White, and Mixed-Race Infants, 156 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 
276, 276-79 (2002); Martine G.H.M. Tax et al., RHC and RHc Genotyping in Different Eth-
nic Groups, 42 TRANSFUSION 634, 641-43 (2002). 
 9. See generally Mark A. Rothstein & Phyllis Griffin Epps, Ethical and Legal Impli-
cations of Pharmacogenomics, 2 NATURE REVS. GENETICS 228-31 (2001).  
 10. See Dr. Francis Collins, Remarks at the White House Press Conference upon the 
completion of the Human Genome Project (June 26, 2000), at http://www.ostp.gov/html/ 
00628_2.html (last visited Jul. 24, 2002) (on file with author).  
 11. See National Human Genome Research Institute, Policy & Ethics: Critical Issues 
and Legislation Surrounding Genetic Research, http://www.genome.gov/PolicyEthics/ (last 
visited Aug. 12, 2002) (on file with author). 
 12. See JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT 13-15, 
16-29, 241 (1993). 
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physicians and scientists gone awry. Social, historical, and legal con-
texts certainly played a role in the ability of the scientists to carry 
out their atrocities, as recent—albeit controversial—scholarship on 
the Holocaust demonstrates.13 But the cultural antecedents of the 
Nazi Doctors have their roots in our collective experience of Doctor 
Frankenstein as an icon of evil rather than simply a nineteenth cen-
tury novel by an 18-year old woman.14 But as Daniel Kevles, a histo-
rian of science, and Paul Lombardo, a bioethicist and lawyer, have 
pointed out to legal and non-legal audiences, respected scientists in 
this country, not just scientists in Nazi Germany, endorsed govern-
mental policies to eliminate certain groups of individuals on the hy-
pothesis that they were “genetically” and socially too risky.15 
 Justice Holmes—a powerful intellectual influence on legal real-
ists16—gave constitutional blessings to some of these governmental 
policies in his famous, but scientifically inaccurate, retort in Buck v. 
Bell: “Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”17 Buck v. Bell is 
cited primarily to question its standing as “good law” by legal schol-
ars,18 but our awareness of social misdeeds in the name of the genetic 
and biological social defense, or the pursuit of scientific knowledge, 
                                                                                                                    
 13. See DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY 
GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST (1996). Although I found Assistant Professor Goldhagen’s 
book illuminating, his fellow historians of the Holocaust have not been as kind to him. 
There have been over fifty reviews of his book in scholarly and popular journals, some of 
them highly critical of Professor Goldhagen’s thesis and his scholarship. See, e.g., Christo-
pher Hitchens, Minority Report: History for Fools, NATION, June 9, 1997, at 8, 8; David 
Schoenbaum, Ordinary People?, NAT’L REV., July 1, 1996, at 54, 54; Fritz Stern, The Gold-
hagen Controversy: One Nation, One People, One Theory?, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1996, 
at 134. There has even been a book published about the controversy over Goldhagen’s book. 
NORMAN G. FINKELSTEIN & RUTH BETTINA BIRN, A NATION ON TRIAL: THE GOLDHAGEN 
THESIS AND HISTORICAL TRUTH (1998). 
 14. Note the continued interest in Frankenstein, which remains a literary classic and 
required reading in many college classes. MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN (J. Paul Hunter 
ed., Norton Critical ed. 1996). The American Library Association and the National Library 
of Medicine will support an eighty-two library exhibition of the classic work beginning in 
the fall of 2002. See http://www.ala.org/publicprograms/frankenstein (last visited Oct. 17, 
2002) (on file with author). 
 15. See DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USE OF 
HUMAN HEREDITY 96-112 (1985); Paul A. Lombardo, Medicine, Eugenics, and the Supreme 
Court: From Coercive Sterilization to Reproductive Freedom, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & 
POL’Y 1, 6 (1996); Paul A. Lombardo, The American Breed: Nazi Eugenics and Origins of 
the Pioneer Fund, 65 ALB. L. REV. 743, 745 (2002) (citing the recent best seller, RICHARD 
HERNSTEIN, THE BELL CURVE (1994), as an example of the continuing presence of eugenic 
thought in our society); Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on 
Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 33 (1985) (investigating the background of the infamous 
case).  
 16. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Decline and Fall of Formalism, in CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 560, 562 
(2001).  
 17. 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
 18. See, e.g., Roberta M. Berry, Note, From Involuntary Sterilization to Genetic En-
hancement: The Unsettled Legacy of Buck v. Bell, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 401, 423 (1998). 
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encourages legal actors to establish certain events as “precedents” 
that law should prevent from recurring. Thus, “eugenic precedents” 
are cases that legal decision makers should avoid. The Nazi Doctors 
Case and the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment on the Negro Male are 
often cited in the bioethics literature as prototypical cases of eugenic 
precedents that should be used as the backdrop for judicial decision-
making.19 
C.    A Recent Case: A Voice of Caution 
 The highly celebrated case of Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, 
Inc.,20 indicates that bioethics scholarship is starting to influence 
courts. The judges in this case used the Nuremberg Judgment in the 
Nazi Doctors Case (the origins of the Nuremberg Code) and the Tus-
kegee Syphilis Experiment to support their holding that a biomedical 
research institution, internationally known for its research and care 
of children with a variety of disabilities,21 could be held liable for 
flawed informed consent processes in a lead abatement study involv-
ing children.22 There is thus a growing confidence on the part of bio-
ethicists that vigorous enforcement of informed consent by judges, 
supposedly established in these eugenic precedents, will help us 
achieve the appropriate risk-benefit ratio as genetic health23 is used 
as a guideline for disease management and research.  
 Although I agree with the Court’s result in Grimes, I seek to pro-
vide a voice of caution against embracing the Grimes court’s ap-
proach during our Human Genome Era. That voice of caution comes 
partially from my understanding of how the institutional arrange-
ments of a given society can influence ordinary people—those who re-
flect the society’s basic and almost unspoken premises about the na-
ture of evil—to react or fail to react to the genocides of their time.24 
We should recall, for instance, that many “ordinary people” knew 
                                                                                                                    
 19. See George J. Annas, Mengele’s Birthmark: The Nuremberg Code in the United 
States Courts, 7 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 17, 19-22 (1991).  
 20. 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001).  
 21. The Kennedy Krieger Institute’s (KKI) stated goal is the training of practicing 
professionals and the discovery of new treatments and prevention of developmental dis-
abilities in children. It was originally founded to treat cerebral palsy as the Children’s Re-
habilitation Center in 1937. KKI has expanded to assist parents and legal guardians who 
care for children with disabilities and to conduct research on various disabilities as well as 
maintaining a seventy-bed pediatric hospital. KKI enlists professors of Johns Hopkins 
University from a variety of fields including medicine (mainly the field of pediatric neurol-
ogy), psychology, education, physical and occupational therapy, audiology, speech and lan-
guage therapy, as well as social work, child development, nutrition, and nursing. See The 
Kennedy Krieger Institute: A Comprehensive Resource for Children with Disabilities, 
http://www.kennedykrieger.org (last visited Aug. 25, 2002) (on file with author). 
 22. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 813. 
 23. See GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION: 
THE SUBJECT’S DILEMMA 49 (1977); Annas, supra note 19, at 24-25.  
 24. See GOLDHAGEN, supra note 13, at 375-79. 
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about the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, but did nothing until 1972. My 
caution also comes from my view of the limits of law in imposing a 
certain ethical vision on the institutions of science and medicine.25  
 These so-called eugenic precedents do, however, contain impor-
tant institutional lessons—but not precedents in a technical sense—
or helpful guidelines for the type of decisions institutions and indi-
viduals must face in the Human Genome Era. Genetic knowledge 
and its use and misuse are not likely to arise as they did in the 
clearly horrific examples of the past. More likely, use and abuse is-
sues will arise in the increasingly common situations in which indi-
viduals encounter scientists and healthcare professionals on the 
fuzzy boundary between the search for new knowledge and tradi-
tional notions of disease management as a mere cure for disease. I 
use the term disease management, however, to describe the range of 
activities that modern health care professionals perform: research, 
treatment of diseases, management of chronic illnesses or conditions, 
and even palliative care for terminally ill patients.26 
 The eugenic precedents provide guidance for ethical reasoning 
about the modern disease management process, but the social values 
underlying ethical reasoning cannot readily be translated into judi-
cial analysis because of the institutional arrangements of law, medi-
cine, and science. As I have stated elsewhere, a comparative institu-
tional analysis of the “eugenics problem” requires some difficult po-
litical and social tradeoffs that neither legislatures nor courts have 
heretofore been able to make upon behalf of society.27 
 I will argue that our focus should be on how genetic knowledge 
shapes disease management and on how courts, using liability doc-
trines, should respond to the risks and benefits of emerging notions 
of genetic health. My approach is essentially incremental, suggesting 
that law may not be the primary factor in preventing the horrors of 
past eugenic practices from recurring. On the other hand, my ap-
proach should help illuminate some issues that a variety of social in-
stitutions, such as families, must face and resolve as notions of ge-
netic health start to dominate public and private discourse. The ge-
                                                                                                                    
 25. See LARRY I. PALMER, ENDINGS AND BEGINNINGS: LAW, MEDICINE AND SOCIETY IN 
ASSISTED LIFE AND DEATH 3-18 (2000). 
 26. Traditional approaches to liability have separated attempts to distinguish be-
tween liability for mishaps in attempts to cure and liability for accidents in clinical re-
search. While there are important doctrinal distinctions having to do with differences be-
tween negligence and “strict liability,” I propose to use the more inclusive term of disease 
management to determine the purposes and contours of a generalized theory of liability. 
See Palmer, supra note 7, at 3-4. I am thus assuming that a major cultural event such as 
the incorporation of genetic explanations into everyday explanations of illness, disease, 
and death, will eventually force a rethinking of legal doctrine. 
 27. See PALMER, supra note 25, at 4-7; Larry I. Palmer, Paying for Suffering: The 
Problem of Human Experimentation, 56 MD. L. REV. 604, 617-19 (1997).  
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netic health cases—wrongful birth or wrongful life—are currently 
separated in literary and judicial reasoning from the “eugenic prece-
dents” that are relevant to the underlying ethical reasoning, if not 
the precise legal holdings of the cases emerging in the Human Ge-
nome Era. The way to link the ethical reasoning of the eugenic 
precedents and the genetic health cases is through a theory of liabil-
ity for modern disease management. Thus, this Article provides an 
outline of an ongoing project to propose a theory of liability in medi-
cal management for the Human Genome Era.28 
 My argument has four parts. Part I reinterprets the lead 
abatement study case as a social, if not strictly a biological, genetic 
case. A public health perspective on the liability issues involved in 
Grimes29 provides a means of arriving at the court’s holding without 
invoking the eugenic precedents of the Nazi Doctors or Tuskegee. 
Part II provides an institutionalist analysis of liability cases when 
parents seek to impose liability on physicians for failure to warn 
them of the risk of disability from an inherited condition in their off-
spring. I will thus seek to answer the question: Is there a standard of 
care for genetic health? Part III suggests using the Tuskegee Study 
and the Nazi Doctors Case as sources of institutional lessons rather 
than as legal precedents. The most important lesson derived from 
this analysis is that political action—an apology for the Tuskegee 
Study by the President of the United States30—institutionalized the 
notion that the ethics of scientific research aimed at better disease 
management will be judged in hindsight.31 Part IV argues that the 
informed consent doctrine in liability cases needs to be reformulated 
in terms of disclosure rather than in terms of promoting individual 
autonomy in the Human Genome Era. A recent case illustrates the 
view that judges should start using liability doctrines to provide in-
centives for physicians, scientists and their related organizations to 
share genetic knowledge with consumers, patients, and their repre-
sentatives. In effect, I will propose a theory of liability for dealing 
with disease management not simply as physicians treating patients, 
but in terms of research to improve overall health of defined groups, 
                                                                                                                    
 28. Other aspects of this project are discussed in my recent piece, Palmer, supra note 
7, at 13-33, and Larry I. Palmer, Medical Liability for Pharmacogenomics, in 
PHARMACOGENOMICS: SOCIAL, ETHICAL, AND CLINICAL DIMENSIONS (Mark A. Rothstein 
ed., forthcoming 2003). 
 29. See Larry I. Palmer, Patient Safety, Risk Reduction, and the Law, 36 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1609, 1635 (1999).  
 30. See President William J. Clinton, Remarks by the President in Apology for Study 
Done in Tuskegee (Mar. 16, 1997), at http://clinton4.nara.gov.textonly/New/Remarks/Fri/ 
19970516-898htmt (last visited Jul. 26, 2002) (on file with author). 
 31. See Palmer, supra note 7, at 25; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological 
Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 576 (1998).  
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i.e., from the perspective of public health.32  
 Ironically, in the end, it will be genetically, socially, or ethnically 
identified groups of individuals who will have the greatest stake in 
minimizing the risks and optimizing the benefits of genetic knowl-
edge. As notions of genetic health emerge, it is the small genetic dif-
ference among individuals that might affect health status, which is of 
interest to both scientists and to each of us as citizens.33 
D.    Public Health, Groups, and Genetic Health 
 Grimes v. Kennedy Kreiger Institute, Inc.,34 held that public health 
research could lead to liability of research institutions for failure in 
the consent process or in its selection of research subjects. Describing 
the context—the surrounding “facts”—of this ruling of potential li-
ability depends upon one’s frame of reference.35 Since I will argue 
that Grimes is about genetic health in at least the popular, if not the 
scientific, sense I will first present the facts and the policy debate 
about modern research from the narrowest of legal perspectives—
what the appellate court believed the “facts” were from the sparse re-
cord. 
 In the two cases involved in the Grimes appeal, parents of minors 
who had agreed to participate in a study of lead abatement in Balti-
more filed an action for negligence against the research institute 
conducting the study.36 The plaintiffs claimed the research organiza-
tion breached its duty of care when it failed to promptly inform them 
of the elevated level of lead in the minor’s blood sample and thus of 
the risk of lead poisoning from the environment in which the plain-
tiffs lived. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants had a duty 
to warn them of the risks of lead poisoning when the defendants’ 
tests indicated the presence of elevated levels of lead dust in their re-
spective residences. In both of the cases, lower courts ruled that the 
research organization was entitled to summary judgment.37 
                                                                                                                    
 32. See Ellen Wright Clayton, The Complex Relationship of Genetics, Groups, and 
Health: What it Means for Public Health, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 290, 291 (2002) (advocat-
ing community consultation between researchers and defined groups in order for genetic 
treatment to progress while reducing risks of abuse). For variously proposed definitions of 
“public health,” see Mark A. Rothstein, Rethinking the Meaning of Public Health, 30 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 144, 147 (2002) (arguing for a narrow definition).  
 33. See Palmer, Medical Liability for Pharmacogenomics, supra note 28, at 199. 
 34. 782 A.2d 807 (2000). 
 35. See DONALD A. SCHÖN & MARTIN REIN, FRAME REFLECTION: TOWARD THE RESOLU-
TION OF INTRACTABLE POLICY CONTROVERSIES 30 (1994). 
 36. Appellant Ericka Grimes and her mother resided in a dwelling that researchers 
claimed had already been completely abated. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 824-26. Appellant 
Myron Higgins and his mother resided in a dwelling deemed to require Level III ($6000-
$7000) abatement, but received only Level II abatement ($3500). See id. at 828.  
 37. The research organization filed a third party complaint against the owners of the 
property. The plaintiffs first sought to add the owners of the property as defendants in an 
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 The nature of both the written form—used to obtain the parents’ 
consent—and the research were important to the court’s holding. The 
study was sponsored by a grant from the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA). Its purpose was to determine if measures short of full 
“lead abatement” were as effective in reducing the risks to children 
as full-fledged lead abatement. To achieve a differential level of lead 
abatement in various groups of dwellings, the state of Maryland pro-
vided loans to property owners.38 The investigators recruited families 
with at least one child to live in these various dwellings and obtained 
the parents’ consent to participate in the study over a two-year pe-
riod. Kennedy Krieger’s written consent form informed the parents of 
the purposes of the study, promised free blood tests for the children,39 
and provided periodic inspections of their premises.40 
 The majority of the court treated the case as one of first impres-
sion, but eventually held that summary judgment was improperly 
granted.41 Thus, a determination of the facts necessary to support an 
ultimate holding that the research institution is liable would await a 
trial.42 Furthermore, in response to a motion for reconsideration, the 
court clarified its holding regarding the legal inability of parents to 
consent to “non-therapeutic” research involving their children.43  
 However, it was what the court said in arriving at its holding that 
is important to genetic health scholarship. The court’s use of the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study and the Nazi Doctors Case to bolster its 
wide, sweeping opinion has placed an ethical question mark on pub-
lic health research involving disadvantaged or low-income urban 
dwellers, most of whom are members of minority groups.44 So while 
                                                                                                                    
amendment to their complaint, but later dismissed the actions against the owners. Id. at 
826, 829. 
 38. Id. at 822. 
 39. While the consent form indicated that the blood tests were not to replace the 
“regular medical care your family obtains,” id. at 824, this fact does not affect the broad 
theory of liability for which I will argue (see discussion infra Part IV). Some might argue 
that the lack of a physician-patient relationship means there is “no duty,” but this reflects 
a narrow view of the duty and does not incorporate the various ways in which liability doc-
trine operates.  
 40. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 824.  
 41. Id. at 858. 
 42. The case is still awaiting trial.  
 43. The court claimed that its use of the words “any risk” meant “any articulable risk 
beyond the minimal kind of risk that is inherent in any endeavor.” Id. at 862. The major-
ity’s implication that parents could not consent to putting their children at risk has caused 
a great deal of concern among members of the research community. I do not directly 
address those concerns in this Article.  
 44. It is worth noting that Johns Hopkins felt compelled to defend Kennedy Krieger. 
See Kennedy Krieger Institute Lead-Based Paint Study, http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/ 
leadpaint.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2002) (on file with author). It is interesting to note that 
in the amicus brief that Johns Hopkins signed, it highlighted its role in dealing with mi-
nority health issues. For example, in regard to sickle cell anemia it stated that: “Johns 
Hopkins Medical School faculty are engaged in important research to find a cure or treat-
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in a technical sense minority groups—particularly those defined as 
such by their race—are not a genetic group, historically and cur-
rently race is constructed biologically.45 Since the court’s result in 
Grimes could have been arrived at on a much narrower ground,46 one 
might wonder if the majority’s invocation of eugenic precedents was 
driven by an underlying fear of racial neglect that leads to institu-
tional neglect and eventually the notion of genocide.  
 Consider the various ways Grimes could be viewed as one consid-
ers facts not cited in the record before the appellate court. At one 
level, Grimes is about environmental health, not genetic health. But 
if we go back and examine the social and economic justification for 
the study, we can see that the research community, judging from 
their briefs,47 saw a “public health crisis” in the city of Baltimore. 
They suggested that the poor and disadvantaged were faced with the 
dilemma of living in “unhealthy housing” or no housing, at least in 
the city of Baltimore.  
 This is not the first time that a disease metaphor was used to jus-
tify certain government housing policies such as urban renewal.48  
Justice Douglas’s opinion, written in 1954, illustrates how deeply sci-
ence and medicine have since shaped our public discourse: 
The experts concluded that if the community were to be healthy, if 
it were not to revert again to a blighted or slum area, as though 
possessed of a congenital disease, the area must be planned as a 
whole. It was not enough, they believed, to remove existing build-
ings that were insanitary [sic] or unsightly.49 
                                                                                                                    
ment for sickle cell anemia, a chronic hereditary blood disease occurring primarily among 
Africans and African-Americans.” Brief of Amici Curiae Association of American Medical 
Colleges et al. at 6, Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001) (Nos. 
128-29), available at http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/press/2001/SEPTEMBER/briefs.htm 
(last visited October 11, 2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter Brief].  
 45. Rothstein & Epps, supra note 9, at 229.  
 46. The concurring opinion by Justice Raker stated that summary judgment was im-
properly granted because sufficient facts supported appellants’ contention that a special 
relationship existed between the parties. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 859. This special relationship 
gave rise to a duty of care that if breached would constitute negligence. Id. Thus, there was 
no need to broach the issue of contract. Id. at 859-61.  
 47. See Brief, supra note 44, at 10. 
 48. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34 (1954). In upholding the constitutionality of 
legislation authorizing the taking of non-dilapidated housing as part of redevelopment or 
“renewal” of inner city “slums,” Justice Douglas also rejected a commercial owner’s claim 
that his otherwise safe and “healthy” property could not be publicly condemned and turned 
over to a private developer. For a discussion of the importance of metaphor in legal writ-
ing, see Larry I. Palmer, Writing Law, in WRITING AND REVISING THE DISCIPLINES 113, 
122-124 (Jonathan Monroe ed., 2002). I am indebted to the late Donald A. Schön for bring-
ing this issue to my attention. See Donald A. Schön, Cornell: Marrying Science, Technol-
ogy, Artistry, the Humanities, and Professional Practice, Keynote Address at the Cornell 
Conference on Professionalism, Vocationalism & Liberal Education 4 (Apr. 9, 1988) (tran-
script and audio cassettes available in the Cornell University Library).  
 49. Parker, 348 U.S. at 34 (emphasis added).  
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There are many reasons today to question the effectiveness of urban 
renewal as a housing policy for inner city areas, but Justice Doug-
las’s enthusiasm for “technical rationality”50 as a guide for evaluating 
legislative determinations continued for many years. Twenty years 
later, in Village of Belle Terre v. Booras,51 Douglas relied upon his 
urban renewal decision to uphold a definition of “family” in a local 
zoning ordinance that prevented unrelated individuals from living in 
a village on Long Island.52 As Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion 
pointed out, the effect of Douglas’s Belle Terre opinion is to allow the 
local government to use traditional definitions of family in zoning or-
dinances that have adverse effects on various individuals or groups.53 
 Today, equally well-meaning researchers see the risks of lead poi-
soning to disadvantaged children as minimal compared to what the 
researchers see as the children’s alternatives. There is in fact no fo-
rum in which the policy framework can be challenged, particularly by 
these modern-day urban dwellers, since the policy framework for 
lead abatement has been institutionalized in law54 and in real life 
such that lead is no longer used in new housing construction.55 But 
when middle and upper-middle class families move into older city 
neighborhoods, does their “renovation” or “gentrification” of these 
older homes involve complete lead abatement? How can we know? 
 So Grimes is a “genetic case” in a social sense, but with a twist on 
what risks certain groups ought to bear. To reduce the biological 
risks of the environment, some individuals must be put at risk, how-
ever slight, in order to gain the knowledge necessary to make the en-
vironment “healthy.” Those at risk—economically disadvantaged 
children in inner cities—are positioned as the beneficiaries, not nec-
essarily as individuals but as a group, from the increase in scientific 
knowledge.  
 Researchers who are motivated by a sense of morality that focuses 
on the good of random and unidentified individuals—the future 
                                                                                                                    
 50. Donald Schön defined the model of technical rationality as: “[P]rofessional activity 
consisting of instrumental problem solving made rigorous by the application of scientific 
theory and technique.” DONALD SCHÖN, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: HOW PROFESSION-
ALS THINK IN ACTION 21 (1984). For how this model relates to legal positivism, see Palmer, 
supra note 29, at 1627.   
 51. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
 52. Id. at 9. 
 53. Id. at 12-20. 
 54. See MD. DEP’T. OF THE ENV’T, THE ABATEMENT OF LEAD PAINT HAZARDS, at 
http://www.mde.state.md.us/health/lead (last visited Aug. 5, 2002) (on file with author); 
CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CDC 
CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING PREVENTION PROGRAM, at http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/ 
lead.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2002) (on file with author).  
 55. See Chapman v. Silber, 760 N.E.2d 329 (N.Y. 2001) (holding that landlords in 
New York State are required to remove lead paint if they know of its existence; thus, it is 
implicit that lead paint cannot be used in New York State).  
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good56—as opposed to traditional professional health care ethics that 
focus on the good of the patient, find it easy to do the cost-benefit 
balance for research subjects. The public good, and in this case, pub-
lic health, becomes the objective. Researchers have very little incen-
tive to consider if those outside of science and its affiliated institu-
tions, such as modern research universities,57 perceive science as 
aiming for the betterment of the common good. Although perhaps po-
litically infeasible at the moment, one might wonder if a better social 
strategy might involve dispersing low-income residents throughout 
metropolitan areas.58 It is also possible that the long-term conse-
quences of the partial lead abatement program is first abandonment 
of older dwellings, but then rebuilding or remodeling of properties 
into housing that only higher income individuals can afford.59 Or put 
another way, from the record before it, the appellate court perhaps 
assumed that the researchers established a framework for improving 
the housing conditions of those at risk for lead poisoning from their 
dwellings without the active participation of those groups in formu-
lating research policy.60  
 Viewed thus, we can understand the moral outrage of the Grimes 
majority that led them to yield to the temptation to invoke common 
                                                                                                                    
 56. See Robert S. Morison, Bioethics after Two Decades, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 
1981, at 8, 9-10 (arguing that in the future ethics will face an increasing number of unfore-
seen possibilities due to advances in science, thereby forcing society to grapple with fun-
damental ethical questions in a new way). 
 57. For a recent attempt to place professions in the context of the growth of the mod-
ern research university, see generally WILLIAM F. MAY, BELEAGUERED RULERS: THE 
PUBLIC OBLIGATION OF THE PROFESSIONAL (2001). 
 58. Cf. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990) (involving an attempt by the 
U.S. Justice Department to force the City of Yonkers to change its public housing policy as 
a means of desegregating the public schools). Framing the “homelessness” policy might 
also be a similar problem of social policy in urban areas that might have a “health compo-
nent.” See SCHÖN & REIN, supra note 35, at 141-45. 
 59. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS 27-32 (2001) (urging consideration of the 
“market” as an institutional force and warning of the effects of a “rights” perspective with-
out considering the institutional costs of those rights).  
 60. There is perhaps a growing awareness of the need to “democratize” research 
through community participation. See DAVYDD J. GREENWOOD, INTRODUCTION TO ACTION 
RESEARCH: SOCIAL RESEARCH FOR SOCIAL CHANGE 175-78 (1998). Even the federal gov-
ernment is calling for “Community-based Participatory Research.” In a recent request for 
proposals to establish multidisciplinary centers to study health disparities, the funding 
agencies required that each center have at least one project that develops, evaluates, or 
implements one such participatory action research project. See Centers for Population 
Health & Health Disparities, NIH, RFA: ES-02-009 (April 1, 2002), at http://grants2.nih. 
gov/grants/guide/rfa-files/RFA-ES-02-009.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2002) (on file with au-
thor). At least one of the researchers involved with the lead paint reductions study in 
Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc., Farfel, appears to be involved as a technical con-
sultant to a community based group. See COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH RESOURCE 
CENTER, TECHNICAL CONSULTANTS AND ADVISORS, http://www.aeclp.org/consultants.html 
(last visited Aug. 26, 2002) (on file with author). Whether his involvement constitutes the 
kind of “participatory action research” as defined by Greenwood, however, cannot be de-
termined. 
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law reasoning to relate its cases to Tuskegee and the Nazi Doctors. 
The Grimes court, however, forgot two significant differences be-
tween the cases before it and these eugenic precedents. First, as I 
have noted before,61 the eugenic precedents are “negative precedents” 
in the sense these “cases” represent policies the court, along with 
most members of society, are trying to avoid, not follow. Normally, 
when the courts claim to be using precedent, it is with the idea of 
furthering some fundamental policy or maintaining some appropriate 
balance the court has achieved. Second, whatever the holdings of 
these infamous cases, neither of them directly involve issues of civil 
liability and are not necessarily relevant to the Grimes court’s task of 
developing a theory of liability at the frontiers of science, medicine, 
and law.62 
 The Grimes majority should have asked the larger question re-
garding liability theory in relation to science and medicine: Under 
what circumstances should courts empower individuals to exercise 
social control over professionals and their organizations?63 The nar-
rower issue raised by the lower court’s granting of summary judg-
ment is whether the plaintiffs as a group should be granted access to 
courts, not whether in fact the plaintiffs can convince a judge and 
jury of the validity of their liability theory under the facts as alleged. 
The former is in fact an institutional question,64 of particular impor-
tance when there are few reported cases involving liability for re-
search miscues.65 Rather than write about the eugenic precedents in 
relation to delineating the liability risks in research, the Grimes 
court should have used the cases as an opportunity to upgrade liabil-
ity theory in several important respects.66  
 First, the court should have been explicit about the structure of 
research that gives rise to liability by allowing its readers to see its 
underlying assumptions about how researchers, physicians, and re-
search organizations ought to relate to each other in a normative 
sense. The court does not say much about the principal investigators 
                                                                                                                    
 61. See supra pp. 4-5. 
 62. I borrow the phrase “frontiers” from LAW, SCIENCE, AND MEDICINE 687 (Judith 
Areen et al. eds., 1996).  
 63.  Id. at 235-312. 
 64. Such a question frames social issues in terms of institutions such as “family for-
mation rather than in terms of a particular social goal, such as procreative liberty.” Larry 
I. Palmer, Life, Death, and Public Policy, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 161, 178 (1995) (book re-
view). 
 65. See Grimes v. Kennedy Kreiger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 835 (Md. 2001).  
 66. There is no reason to believe that the Grimes court was liberal in its interpreta-
tion of the scope of the so-called “informed consent doctrine.” See Wright v. Johns Hopkins 
Health Care Sys. Corp., 728 A.2d 166, 179 (Md. 1999) (discussing the Maryland Court of 
Appeals decision which held that physicians are not liable to the estate of an AIDS patient 
who was resuscitated despite a living will, which expressly stated a desire not to be resus-
citated). For a discussion of the case see Palmer, supra note 7, at 18 n.86. 
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since they were apparently not named as defendants, but their back-
grounds and professional affiliations are illustrative of how the mod-
ern biomedical research enterprise must operate. Both of the lead re-
searchers held academic positions at Johns Hopkins, one in the 
school of medicine and the other in the school of public health.67 Both 
also held important positions at Kennedy Krieger, but the court does 
not explain why this multi-layered set of relationships might be rele-
vant to a particular theory of liability.  
 One possible theory of liability is that only physicians have a duty 
to warn individuals of the risks discovered through diagnostic inter-
ventions such as blood tests. The Grimes court rejects this theory and 
the implicit idea that lack of informed consent liability is based on 
contract rather than liability theories,68 but fails to tell us why. I be-
lieve that the court is assuming that the researchers have an obliga-
tion to have access to physicians whenever they know there are 
physical risks to the subjects. The court need not assume that the re-
searchers have an obligation, in fact, to provide subjects with access 
to health care professionals.69 As a result, at the very least, the 
Grimes court requires researchers to inform subjects of any increased 
physical risks the researchers discover and advise the subjects to 
seek immediate professional health care.  
 Second, the court should have been more explicit about why it is 
appropriate to link public health researchers to physicians in its the-
ory of liability. More generally, medicine and related professions such 
as public health, nursing, dentistry and pharmacy, are distinguished 
from other professions by their ethical and legal authority to rou-
tinely intrude into the human body or obtain information about the 
                                                                                                                    
 67. Although the Grimes opinion cites Dr. Mark Farfel as the researcher in charge, 
782 A.2d at 813, the Baltimore Sun op-ed piece cites the late Dr. Julian J. Chisholm and 
Dr. Mark Farfel as the researchers. See Don Ryan, Researcher on Lead Hazards is Solu-
tion, Not Problem, BALT. SUN, Aug. 28, 2001, at 19A. The late Chisholm was a founder of 
the Kennedy Krieger Institute’s Lead Clinic and then Professor of Medicine at Johns Hop-
kins University School of Medicine. See Jim Haner et al., Pioneer in Lead Study, Julian 
Chisholm, dies: Kennedy Krieger researcher treated poisoned children, BALT. SUN, June 22, 
2001, at 1A. Dr. Mark Farfel is Director, Lead Hazard Abatement Research Department at 
Kennedy Krieger, see Kennedy Krieger Institute: A Comprehensive Resource for Children 
with Disabilities, http://www.kennedykrieger.org (last visited Aug. 25, 2002) (on file with 
author), and Associate Professor, Department of Health Policy and Management at the 
School of Public Health at Johns Hopkins University, see Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School 
of Public Health, http://www.jhsph.edu (last visited Aug. 5, 2002) (on file with author).  
 68. See Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 956-57 
(1994) (discussing different manifestations of informed consent doctrine and advocating 
contractual view of medical liability). 
 69. The language in the consent form which states that the study is intended only “to 
monitor the effects of the repairs and is not intended to replace the [family’s] regular medi-
cal care,” Grimes, 782 A.2d at 824, is not problematic under my analysis. In theory, allow-
ing for independent medical care protects the interests of subjects as well as investigators, 
although social, economic, and geographical factors may limit the access of the Grimes sub-
jects. 
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functioning or malfunctioning of the human body.70 Although the in-
vestigators were not named in the lawsuit,71 the court assumes that 
health care professionals are linked in some way, probably through a 
variety of organizational and, ultimately, economic relationships that 
are so sufficiently institutionalized that they need not be discussed. 
For instance, Johns Hopkins’ Institutional Review Board oversaw the 
research protocol in Grimes72 even though the Krieger Institute is a 
legally distinct entity. Despite the legal form of the various not-for-
profits involved in some way with the research, the Grimes court 
viewed the professionals in these various organizations as connected 
by their professional ethos.73 Although perhaps holding different 
types of licenses or educational credentials, health care professionals 
are viewed as united through their commitment to “technical ration-
ality”74 in defining and solving problems, especially when it comes to 
research.  
 Third, and perhaps most important, the Grimes court shifts the 
focus from the liability of individual researchers to the liability of the 
organization. Traditionally, liability theory in health care is centered 
in the special standard of care established for physicians in negli-
gence law—malpractice.75 With the idea that most physicians and 
surgeons in this country are legally independent contractors,76 liabil-
                                                                                                                    
 70. There is, of course, no easy way to explain why some individuals who routinely 
touch and intrude upon the human body—hair stylists, for instance—are licensed, but not 
thought of as “health care professionals.” For the purposes of my discussion in this Article, 
it is sufficient to point out that those whom we think of as “health care professionals” are 
judged by the standard of negligence, even when they use products that injure clients, 
whereas hair stylists are strictly liable for the products they use on their clients’ bodies. 
Newmark v. Gimbel’s, Inc., 258 A.2d 697 (1969) (holding that a beauty parlor operator 
could be held strictly liable for injuries caused by the use of a product to give the “cus-
tomer” a permanent wave, even though a dentist was only liable in negligence for using a 
needle with a latent defect). 
 71. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc. is the only defendant named in the opinion.  
Grimes, 782 A.2d at 813-14. 
 72. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc. is described as an “affiliate” of Johns Hopkins ac-
cording to a joint press release. See Kennedy Krieger Institute, Johns Hopkins Response to 
Court of Appeals Ruling in Lead Paint Case, at http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/press/ 
2001/October/courtofappeals.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2002) (on file with author). 
 73. The nature of professionalism or even health care professionalism is a matter of 
considerable debate. The traditional notion of professions as “self-regulating” is being chal-
lenged on a number of fronts, including health care. See, e.g., E.J. Emanuel & L.L. 
Emanuel, What is Accountability in Health Care?, 124 ANN. INTERNAL MED. 229, 229-39 
(1996); L.L. Emanuel, A Professional Response to Demands for Accountability: Practical 
Recommendations Regarding Ethical Aspects of Patient Care, 124 ANN. INTERNAL MED. 
240, 242-43 (1996). 
 74. See definition of technical rationality, supra note 50. 
 75. For the classic statement on the standard, see Allan H. McCoid, The Care Re-
quired of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549, 558 (1959).  
 76. There are economic and social forces encouraging physicians to become “employ-
ees” or even beholden to third party networks or health plans, but the idea of physicians as 
independent contractors is deeply embedded in liability doctrine, at least in the United 
States. See, e.g., Sword v. NKC Hospitals, Inc., 714 N.E.2d 142 (Ind. 1999) (struggling with 
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ity of hospitals for the mistakes of physicians has been rare until 
fairly recently.77 But the Grimes court allows a suit against the re-
search organization without explicitly stating that research is gov-
erned by principles of what has been referred to as “enterprise liabil-
ity.”78 The principal investigators in Grimes may turn out to be em-
ployees of the Institute as the facts are later developed, making the 
case for vicarious liability clear. But there are some general features 
about modern research that the Grimes court does not explain that 
make enterprise liability the norm for research, even if individual re-
searchers remain liable in some situations.  
 Under federal regulations, the entity receiving federal research 
funds is responsible for the overall conduct of the research.79 It is the 
research organization that is ultimately accountable for the research 
to the federal government. In the current regulatory scheme, the in-
stitution is supposed to supervise the investigator, who in reality 
does the actual study or experiment; the institution provides over-
sight for the consent process through its Institutional Review Board. 
More explicitly, the investigator has an ethical obligation to protect 
the subject in his or her study, but the organization has at least a 
regulatory obligation to protect human subjects generally. The 
Grimes court, with explicit support from the regulations,80 simply 
held that the organization’s failure to provide that protection, in vio-
                                                                                                                    
theories of apparent agency to determine if a hospital might be liable for the alleged mis-
deeds of an anesthesiologist who is not an employee but who practices within the hospital).  
 77. See Clark C. Havighurst, Vicarious Liability: Relocating Responsibility for the 
Quality of Medical Care, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 22-24 (2000).  
 78.  Enterprise liability has been defined generally as “[a] legal regime in which 
manufacturers are liable for the costs of all product-caused accidents.” Jon D. Hanson & 
Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipula-
tion, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1423 (1999). Enterprise liability is defined in health care as 
“various circumstances when an organization, for instance a hospital, health maintenance 
organization, or even a health plan is potentially liable to injured patient.” William M. 
Sage et al., Enterprise Liability for Medical Malpractice and Health Care Quality Im-
provement, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 1, 1-28 (1994) (discussing medical malpractice and reform 
theories of liability). For example, the hospital might be liable for failure to fulfill its obli-
gations to patients by not providing appropriate staff in the emergency room. In another 
example, a hospital might be held legally responsible for the injuries caused by a non-
employee, such as a surgeon, who is considered an independent contractor. See id. at 18-20. 
For the use of enterprise liability in attempts to reduce medical error and assuage provider 
concerns about “malpractice” see William M. Sage, Principles, Pragmatism, and Medical 
Injury, 286 JAMA 226, 227 (2001). 
 79. See generally 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-46.120 (2001). 
 80. Many clinical researchers and their lawyers believe that IRB approval provides 
immunity from lawsuits, but the federal regulations are specific:  
No informed consent, whether oral or written, may include any exculpatory lan-
guage through which the subject or the representative is made to waive or appear 
to waive any of the subject’s legal rights, or releases or appears to release the in-
vestigator, the sponsor, the institution or its agents from liability for negligence. 
45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2001) (cited in Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 847 
(Md. 2001)). See Palmer, supra note 7, at 32.  
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lation of a court-established duty, could potentially constitute negli-
gence. From a systems perspective on accountability for subject pro-
tection in research, allowing the liability to fall on the research or-
ganization rather than on the investigator or physician makes 
sense.81 
 More generally, “enterprise liability,” as opposed to “professional 
liability,” as the locus of a liability theory82 makes sense in an era of 
genetic health for two reasons. First, enterprise liability encourages 
organizations to exercise some degree of control over the physicians 
and investigators operating within the organization. While profes-
sional liability and its accompanying professional/client dyad is the 
ethical foundation for liability doctrine, enterprise liability acknowl-
edges the multidisciplinary reality of modern health care. In cases 
involving genetic health, as demonstrated in Part II, it is apparent 
that research and treatment involved in genetic health are complex 
and involve patient and family member interaction with a number of 
different professionals—for example, physicians, nurses, lab techni-
cians and genetic counselors—who have various levels of related 
competencies. 
 Second, enterprise liability acknowledges what was only implicit 
in the earlier “wrongful birth” and “wrongful life” cases: genetic 
health requires a degree of specialization or a special branch of pro-
fessional knowledge to be acquired by health care providers. In effect, 
liability doctrine can be used to encourage only certain providers 
(with the appropriate expertise)—academic medical centers—to deal 
with genetic health. Although not all individuals or groups have 
equal access to academic health centers, it is not clear that universal 
access to genetic health practitioners is in fact a social good, given 
the eugenic risks.83 
                                                                                                                    
 81. A reporting systems approach was first suggested as a means of reducing medical 
errors or achieving greater patient safety. See TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER 
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 86 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2001); Palmer, supra note 29, at 1623-
24. For a recent report on deaths occurring during clinical experiments at leading institu-
tions such as Johns Hopkins and University of Pennsylvania, see John Herzfeld, OHRP 
Suspension of Johns Hopkins Research Led to Improved Safety, Attitude, Deans Say, 1 
MED. RES. L. & POL’Y 142, 142, (2002); Joann Loviglio, Gene Therapy Patient Dies Under 
HUP Care, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN, Sept. 30, 1999, at http://www.dailypennsylvanian.com 
(last visited Aug. 26, 2002) (on file with author).  
 82. Sage et al., supra note 78, at 28. 
 83. A “rights” approach to access to health care might lead one to argue for greater 
access to genetic research and interventions on the part of disadvantaged individuals. But 
an institutional approach poses questions of access in terms of trade-offs. Given a choice 
between new genetic therapies and access to primary health care, it is not clear what dis-
advantaged individuals might choose. It has been said that the US has the “best” medicine 
or health care in the Western World, but it is not clear that the overall health status of the 
entire population is poor when compared to other industrialized countries. In point of fact, 
the US ranks near the bottom in terms of health status indicators when compared to socie-
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II.   IS THERE A STANDARD OF CARE FOR GENETIC DISEASE? 
 Although there is a great deal of scholarship and numerous judi-
cial opinions dealing with so-called “wrongful life” or “wrongful 
birth”84 cases, I propose to treat these as raising one larger question: 
Have courts established in liability law a standard of care for how 
health care professionals should deal with issues of genetic health? 
By framing the question in this manner, I seek to situate the issues 
of genetic health within the traditional specialized standard of care 
for health care professionals in liability doctrine.85 Such juxtaposition 
immediately highlights the fact that traditional malpractice stan-
dards are built on the paradigm of physical injury and physically in-
vasive treatment.86 
 Most of these genetic health cases arose after judges introduced 
                                                                                                                    
ties with more drinkers and smokers than ours such as France or Sweden. See Barbara 
Starfield, Is US Health Really the Best in the World?, 284 JAMA 483, 483 (2000).  
 84. See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 957 (Cal. 1982) (noting that lower California 
courts recognized wrongful birth actions); Quinn v. Blau, 1997 W.L. 781874 at *2 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 1997) (unpublished opinion stating that “Connecticut courts have recognized a 
cause of action for wrongful birth brought by parents”); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 758 
(N.J. 1984) (noting that in Berman, New Jersey recognized that parents may recover for 
emotional distress for wrongful birth of child born with birth defects); Berman v. Allan, 
404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979) (sustaining cause of action for wrongful birth of child with Down’s 
Syndrome); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 492 (Wash. 1983) (taking “major 
step” recognizing wrongful birth action); Lori B. Andrews, Torts and the Double Helix: 
Malpractice Liability for Failure to Warn of Genetic Risks, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 149, 150-61 
(1992) (analyzing history and future of “wrongful birth” and “wrongful life” cases where li-
ability hinged on failure to test or warn about genetic risk). See generally Carolyn Lee 
Brown, Genetic Malpractice: Avoiding Liability, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 857 (1986) (discussing 
perils of genetic counseling); Janet L. Tucker, Wrongful Life: A New Generation, 27 J. FAM. 
L. 673 (1989) (discussing “wrongful life” cases, which she defines as an “action brought by 
or on behalf of an infant born with genetic defects”).  
 85. See Daniel W. Shuman, The Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice Claims, 
Clinical Practice Guidelines, and Managed Care: Towards a Therapeutic Harmony?, 34 
CAL. W. L. REV. 99, 100 (1997) (noting that common set of instructions provides that “the 
duty of the professional [is] to use such skill, prudence and diligence as other members of 
his profession commonly possess and exercise”) (quoting Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 
P.2d 745, 772 n.21 (Cal. 1992)). For a discussion of the history of standard of care, see 
James A. Henderson, Jr., & John A. Siliciano, Universal Health Care and the Continued 
Reliance on Custom in Determining Medical Malpractice, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1382, 1383-
1400 (1994) (discussing how tort law seeks to police delivery of health care); Michelle M. 
Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Medical Mal-
practice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 654-62 (2001) (discussing evolution and devel-
opment of standard of care physicians are held to in medical malpractice cases); Philip G. 
Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the Millennium, 
57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 201-05 (2000) (discussing history of standard of care for phy-
sicians in medical malpractice cases in relation to broader fabric of general negligence 
law).  
 86. See Suzanne K. Ketler, Note, The Rebirth of Informed Consent: A Cultural Analy-
sis of the Informed Consent Doctrine After Schreiber v. Physicians Insurance Co. of 
Wisconsin, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1029, 1034-39 (2001) (providing explanation of this older line 
of battery-based cases concerning informed consent as well as shift to using negligence-
based liability).  
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another theory of medical liability, the doctrine of lack of informed 
consent.87 Thus the prototype case relating to genetic health arose in 
the 1970s and later involved not the issue of whether the health care 
provider performed a procedure or intervention in accordance with 
“prevailing medical standards,” but whether the parent should have 
been informed of certain genetic risks. The emerging standard of care 
for genetic health issues in law is thus a post hoc determination by 
judges and juries that a physician should have told the parents of the 
risk of some inherited disorder in their child.88  
 The underlying assumption of these genetic health cases is that 
the prospective parents have been deprived of the opportunity to de-
cide not to have a child with the disease or disability, or the opportu-
nity to prepare themselves for a child with such a disability. Of 
course, without a woman’s legal right to have an abortion, as the 
New Jersey courts have pointed out, these genetic liability claims 
would not be theoretically possible.89 But I believe the better articu-
lation of the assumption is in terms of the lack of opportunity to 
choose whether to risk having a child with a disability. Recall the 
story of my son’s birth. The knowledge that he might need a complete 
blood transfusion when born helped at least this parent endure the 
four hours that the blood transfusion took and the subsequent days 
and nights in the special care nursery.90  
 The latest permutations of this line of cases involves whether the 
duty to disclose imposes an obligation on the health professional to 
inform a patient’s child or relative of the risk of inheritable disease.91 
                                                                                                                    
 87. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that test for 
determining whether potential peril must be divulged is its materiality to patient’s deci-
sion); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1972) (analyzing physician’s duty to patient and 
determining that there is a duty of reasonable disclosure concerning available choices with 
respect to proposed therapy and dangers inherently and potentially involved).  
 88. See Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278, 280 (Fla. 1995) (holding that a physician has 
a duty to warn a parent of the genetically inheritable nature of his or her disease); Schroe-
der v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834, 842 (N.J. 1981) (holding that doctor was liable for failing to 
recognize cystic fibrosis in the first child and inform the parents that they were carriers of 
disease, which deprived them of informed choice to assume risk of second child). For a dis-
cussion of Threlkel see Palmer, supra note 7, at 15-16. 
 89. See, e.g., Hummel v. Reiss, 608 A.2d 1341, 1343 (N.J. 1992). Indeed most courts 
acknowledge that the right to procreative choice stems from a woman’s right to an abortion 
established in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
 90. Without that knowledge, I suspect there is a greater risk on the part of at least 
some parents in the shock of discovery of “problems” to stigmatize the child as “sick,” “dis-
abled,” and perhaps “unlovable,” at least until the child is restored as “healthy.” 
 91. See Threlkel, 661 So. 2d at 282 (holding that patient’s children were within fore-
seeable zone of risk and patient can ordinarily be expected to pass on warning). See L.J. 
Deftos, Genomic Torts: The Law of the Future—The Duty of Physicians to Disclose the Pres-
ence of a Genetic Disease to the Relatives of Their Patients with the Disease, 32 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 105, 106 (1997) (describing cases and statutory law regarding genetic information as 
developing into area of law dubbed “genomic torts” and proposing that genomic concepts of 
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These cases are an indication that the very notion of genetic health 
and disease pushes the parameters of the assumption of the tradi-
tional standard of care. Or put another way, if the justification of a 
special standard of care for health care professionals was based in 
part on preserving the special social function of the profes-
sional/client relationship, issues of genetic health question that basic 
assumption. Another way of stating this point is to suggest that 
knowledge-flow in the traditional understanding of standard of care 
is from the professional to the client.92  
 But once the notion of genetic health is institutionalized in health 
care practices through genetic screening of prospective parents, fe-
tuses, and embryos,93 the flow of knowledge must be from profes-
sional to some type of genetically defined group. While there is a risk 
to traditional notions of client/professional confidentiality in this 
suggestion,94 recall that I am only making an argument for cases in-
volving aspects of genetic health. 
 In making this argument, I should also note that there is no uni-
formity among courts about the theoretical basis of liability for fail-
ure to disclose information to patients.95 Furthermore, legislatures 
have reacted to the so-called “first revolution” of informed consent96 
and limited the circumstances under which individuals can recover.97 
                                                                                                                    
privity and privilege will dissolve third-party shield that often protects defendants from 
remote plaintiffs).  
 92. See JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 48-59 (1984) (arguing 
that the doctrine of informed consent cannot protect patient autonomy).  
 93. Some of the papers in the symposium issue will make this point.  
 94. See Janet L. Dolgin, Choice, Tradition, and the New Genetics: The Fragmentation 
of the Ideology of Family, 32 CONN. L. REV. 523, 551 (2000) (noting that the doctrine of in-
formed consent is “[a]ttractive . . . in part because it placates concerns about variations of 
privacy while interfering less with the goals of industry and science than rules defining 
genetic information as property”).  
 95. See Duttry v. Patterson, 771 A.2d 1255, 1257 (Pa. 2001) (holding that a surgeon’s 
personal characteristics were irrelevant to a patient giving informed consent). 
 96. The decision in Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996), has been called 
the second revolution in informed consent doctrine. See generally Aaron D. Twerski & Neil 
B. Cohen, The Second Revolution in Informed Consent: Comparing Physicians to Each 
Other, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1999) (discussing changes that might occur due to Kokemoor); 
Ketler, supra note 86, at 1052 (discussing Kokemoor and new cases which further expand 
informed consent in Wisconsin in therapeutic settings). For a more moderate perspective 
on the expected effect of Kokemoor, see Lynn M. LoPucki, Twerski and Cohen’s Second 
Revolution: A Systems/Strategic Perspective, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 55 (1999) (arguing that ef-
fect of change will be moderate rather than revolutionary, and that Twerski and Cohen fo-
cus on legal issues that the Kokemoor court left undecided).  
 97. See Hecht v. Kaplan, 645 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (holding that un-
der New York statutes on informed consent, plaintiff must prove that there was some “un-
consented-to affirmative violation” of her physical integrity in order to sustain cause of ac-
tion). In Hecht, the physician drew an extra vial of blood and performed a blood test for 
Human T-Cell Leukemia Virus (HTLV), a contagious disease, while his patient only con-
sented to have her blood tested for cytomegalovirus (CMV). See id. at 52 (discussing plain-
tiff’s claim that testing of blood for HTLV amounted to “human research without her con-
sent”). Although the HTLV test result was positive, the physician failed to inform the pa-
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As a consequence, some courts, relying upon statutory definitions re-
garding lack of informed consent98 and legislation protecting genetic 
privacy,99 might well hold that physicians have no duty to inform 
relatives of the risks of genetic disease. This lack of uniformity in ap-
proaches to disclosure liability cases generally should remind us, 
first, that court-developed liability doctrine is always subject to po-
litical reaction or even reformulation.100 Second, and perhaps just as 
important, liability doctrine remains primarily local in the sense that 
it is a function of state law in our system, but the ethical and social 
impact of notions of genetic health will be global. 
III.   ARE THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT AND THE NAZI 
DOCTORS CASE PRECEDENTS FOR THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE                        
IN GENETIC DISEASE CASES? 
 The Grimes court was undoubtedly aware that neither the Nur-
emberg Judgment in the Nazi Doctors’ trial nor the Tuskegee Syphi-
lis Study involved issues of civil liability. When litigation was com-
menced on behalf of the Tuskegee survivors, the theory of the lawsuit 
was based on a violation of the survivors’ constitutional rights, and 
the suit was brought against governmental entities, not research or-
ganizations such as the Tuskegee Institute.101 The Nazi Doctors Case 
involved criminal adjudications under international law,102 a long 
way from the kinds of cost-benefit analyses we associate with modern 
liability theory. It might be appropriate to extract some broader prin-
ciples from these cases103 were one convinced there were no other way 
                                                                                                                    
tient of the results of the test for several months. See id. (stating that failure to inform en-
dangered the health of the plaintiff’s husband); see also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(2) 
(McKinney 2001) (stating that “right of action to recover for medical . . . malpractice based 
on a lack of informed consent is limited to those cases involving either (a) non-emergency 
treatment, procedure or surgery, or (b) a diagnostic procedure requiring invasion or disrup-
tion of the integrity of the body”).  
 98. See Hecht, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 52 (challenging the notion that informed consent is 
rooted in the right to bodily autonomy).  
 99. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-l(2)(a) (McKinney 2002) (banning genetic test-
ing on “sample[s] taken from an individual without prior written informed consent”). 
 100. One might consider if the Grimes court wrote such a broad opinion in order to 
shape the legislative debate. Notice that the legislature, with appropriate lobbying by a va-
riety of interest groups, enacted a statute requiring the disclosure of the minutes of all 
IRBs in Maryland. H. Res. 917, 416th Sess. (Md. 2002).  
 101. See Palmer, supra note 27, at 609. 
 102. The recent use of military tribunals against some individuals following the 
destruction of the World Trade Center and portions of the Pentagon has made the public 
and legal scholars aware that military tribunals do not operate like our domestic criminal 
courts. See Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the 
Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1260-63 (2002); Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Sets Op-
tion of Military Trials in Terrorist Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001, at A1; William Gla-
berson, Closer Look at New Plan for Trying Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at B6. 
 103. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 232 (1977) (attempting to jus-
tify extraction of non-utilitarian principles from the Constitution for judges to apply).  
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to arrive at the court’s result,104 or if there were no negative conse-
quences to attempted extraction. The Nazi Doctors Case and the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study provide two different kinds of perspectives 
on issues related to genetic health and liability. Before outlining the 
doctrinal innovations we need for genetic health and disease, let me 
begin with the institutional lessons Tuskegee imparts. 
A.   Institutional Lessons from the Tuskegee Study 
 It is tempting to dismiss the Tuskegee Study in legal discourse be-
cause there was no binding legal precedent from the litigation follow-
ing discovery of the study in 1972. It is equally tempting to place too 
much emphasis on the Tuskegee Study because it has become part of 
our ethical discourse in popular and political culture because of the 
prize winning play and made-for-television movie, Miss Evers’ 
Boys.105 I want to draw some enduring lessons from each perspective. 
 Technically, the theory of the lawsuit filed on behalf of the Tuske-
gee “subjects/patients” was that they were chosen by state and fed-
eral agencies because of their “race.” Since the federal government 
paid a settlement to the survivors and their representatives, one 
might argue that the claim had some plausibility. But what if one 
asks: Were the African-American professionals and health care insti-
tutions involved with the study somehow exempt from any form of 
legal liability? Are they to be excused ethically for their participation 
because of their race?106 
 Rather than engaging in a kind of comparative “badness” analy-
sis, I have suggested in previous publications that all of the partici-
pants in the Tuskegee Study should be viewed as “‘good’ individuals 
unable to see that they practiced medicine . . . under what were bad 
institutional arrangements.”107 So viewed, Tuskegee vividly illus-
trates how the professional ethos of science may be more powerful 
than any socially imposed notions of race or ethnicity. In the contem-
porary context, just because members of so-called minority or stigma-
                                                                                                                    
 104. As I have noted elsewhere, there is a straightforward analysis of liability doctrine 
for arriving at the Grimes court’s result, as demonstrated by the concurrence. Grimes v. 
Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 859-61 & n.45 (Justice Raker found that facts 
existed supporting appellant’s contention that a special relationship existed that created a 
duty on behalf of appellee—thus, there was no need to broach any other issue).  
 105. MISS EVERS’ BOYS (Warner Home Video 1997); it is important to remember that 
the Tuskegee Study is itself an enduring legacy. See Palmer, supra note 29, at 1655; 
TUSKEGEE LESSONS: SYPHILIS STUDY LEAVES BEHIND LEGACY OF MISTRUST (NPR radio 
broadcast, July 25, 2002) available at http://www.npr.org/programs/morning/features/2002/ 
jul/tuskegee/index.html (providing audio and textual version of Dr. Vanessa Northington 
Gamble’s commentary on the legacy of Tuskegee) (last visited Oct. 11, 2002) (on file with 
author).  
 106. See Palmer, supra note 27, at 608-10.  
 107. PALMER, supra note 25, at 7. 
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tized groups are involved in pushing the medical frontiers does not 
prevent eugenic abuses from occurring.108 
 More pertinent for this symposium, the underlying scientific and 
public health problem that led to the Tuskegee Study—syphilis—was 
at the time a “chronic disease” or at least an “incurable” disease. 
Medical progress as defined a half-century ago, primarily the inter-
vention of powerful pharmaceuticals, led to an effective treatment. 
With the growth in knowledge about the genetic nature of disease 
and proposed treatment modalities, the current thrust of public pol-
icy is to ensure participation by minorities so as to avoid some of the 
“bad institutional arrangements,” such as treatments with adverse 
and less effective results in specific minority groups. 
 The second important lesson of Tuskegee comes from political in-
stitutions. When President Clinton apologized for the Tuskegee 
Study, he established that medical and scientific interventions are to 
be judged by current ethical understandings rather than those opera-
tive when physicians and scientists undertook the interventions—or 
in the case of Tuskegee, failed to intervene.109 On the other hand, 
Clinton also helped to institutionalize the bioethics profession when 
he authorized funding for a National Bioethics Institute at Tuskegee. 
This act was in keeping with a long tradition in this country of label-
ing minority-focused professional activities “National” and majori-
tarian professional groups “American,” for example the National Bar 
Association as distinct from the American Bar Association. The work 
of legal institutions will in some respect have an overseer body—the 
bioethics profession and its institutional form will be the multidisci-
plinary bioethics commissions. 
B.   Issues of Jurisprudence from the Nazi Doctors Cases 
 I will not describe the Nazi Doctors Case except to say several 
Nazi physicians were executed and others imprisoned by a United 
States-sponsored international tribunal for their participation in ex-
periments using concentration camp inmates.110 Since a court had 
judged their conduct as “bad” even for the conditions of war, the 
Grimes court, like many of the commentators it cites, starts with the 
proposition that the Nuremberg case is the “most complete and au-
                                                                                                                    
 108. See PALMER, supra note 25, at 4-7; Palmer, supra note 27, at 611-13. 
 109. Failure to intervene in genetic health cases has come up before in the DES litiga-
tion. See Mink v. Univ. of Chi., 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978). 
 110. For a more complete description of the trial, see excerpts available at The U.S. 
Holocaust Memorial Museum, The Doctors Trial: The Medical Case of the Subsequent Nur-
emberg Proceedings, at http://www.ushmm.org/research/doctors/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2002) 
(on file with author); see also the forthcoming collection on the Doctor’s Case to be posted 
online by the Harvard Law School Library, at http://www.law.harvard.edu/library/digital/ 
war_crime_trials_nuremberg.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2002) (on file with author). 
260  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:237 
 
thoritative statement of the law of informed consent to human ex-
perimentation.”111 Such statements lull legal actors into believing 
that courts might be able to halt “eugenic” uses of the growing body 
of genetic knowledge without examining all of the problems that sur-
round treating those ethical guidelines as “law.” Thus the first prob-
lem: What were the Nazi Doctors’ crimes in a legal sense? 
 The repulsion that we feel in even hearing about the atrocities 
committed makes us very comfortable lumping all these actions un-
der the rubric of “war crimes.” In point of fact, the Nazi Doctors were 
convicted of both “war crimes” and “crimes against humanity,” which 
raises the question: What is the distinction between the two types of 
crimes under international law? In experiments aimed at aiding the 
war efforts, such as finding better treatment for malaria, I have ar-
gued the defendants were guilty of “war crimes.”112 Asking for the 
inmate’s informed consent would not have made the experiments le-
gal, in my view, since the essence of the complaint and the evidence 
against the doctors was that they caused “excessive deaths” by the 
manner in which the doctors carried out their studies.113 Further-
more, the Nazi Doctors’ malaria experiments were similar in some 
respects to American wartime malaria experiments on incarcerated 
prisoners, according to the prosecutors who attempted to distinguish 
the two through an American “ethics expert.”114 These “war crimes” 
charges are not sources of principles for the emerging issues of ge-
netic health.  
 The “crimes against humanity” portion of the Nuremberg Judg-
ment, however, does provide some principles that could inform judi-
cial attempts to develop doctrines relevant to genetic health. The 
prototypical crimes against humanity used by the Nazi Doctors in-
volved the use of powerful drugs and x-rays on Russians, Poles, Jews 
and other groups. The object of these experiments was elimination of 
groups of civilians. The crimes against humanity doctrine might pro-
vide a principle for the civil lawsuits or legislation, whereas I doubt 
the relevance of the war crimes to civil lawsuits. But the principle 
one might derive from the crimes against humanity might be only a 
weak one: there should be some institutional checks on science and 
medicine, and in some circumstances liability rules provide the ap-
propriate check.115  
                                                                                                                    
 111. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 835 (Md. 2001).  
 112. See Palmer, supra note 7, at 28-31.  
 113. See JUDITH AREEN ET AL., LAW, SCIENCE, AND MEDICINE 993-1001 (2d ed. 1996).  
 114. Whether or not the so-called expert, Dr. Ivy from the American Medical Associa-
tion, succeeded in distinguishing the two types of studies in his testimony is subject to 
some debate. See Jon M. Harkness, Nuremberg and the Issue of Wartime Experiments on 
U.S. Experiments, 276 JAMA 1672, 1673 (1996); Jon M. Harkness, The Significance of the 
Nuremberg Code, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 995, 996 (1998). 
 115. See Palmer, supra note 7, at 28-31. 
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 My concern with the use of the eugenic precedents by the Grimes’ 
court is twofold. First, I worry that the legal actors, including many 
scholars, will assume that the Nazi Doctors Case and the Tuskegee 
Study are clearly the eugenic type of precedents legal actors could 
use to prevent misuse of the growing body of genetic knowledge 
about the nature of disease. Second, I am concerned that a failure to 
understand the true legal response to these socially and ethically 
horrific events blurs the need for true legal innovation. There are in-
stitutional lessons to be learned and a weak principle to be derived 
from these events, but these lessons are mere frameworks for deci-
sion makers, many of whom may not be courts or bodies that rely 
upon “precedents” in the way common law judges do. 
IV.   HOW DO SOCIAL GROUPS PARTICIPATE IN ELIMINATING         
GENETIC DISABILITIES? 
 The laboratory, or more specifically the gene sequencing facility, 
is crucial to the development of genetically-informed treatments or 
even “cures,” but eventually the physicians and scientists need hu-
man subjects. The combination of the legally imposed duty to inform 
prospective parents of genetic risks, along with the scientific impera-
tive of alleviating disease and disability, creates a new set of tools in 
health care delivery: genetic screening and what some have called 
“eugenic abortions”116 to avoid disability. As this new type of disease 
management takes hold, the distinctions between liability for ex-
perimentation and liability for breach of duties in treatment will 
break down. At some point, otherwise “healthy”—in the sense that 
they do not (yet) have any manifestations of the disease—individuals 
who may have a certain “gene” must become a part of the search for a 
cure.  
 Since some of the early genetic health cases involved Tay-Sachs,117 
I will use a pending case involving a similar disease, Canavan Dis-
ease, to illustrate what is on the frontier of legal liability and disease 
management in relation to genetic health.  
 Canavan Disease is a genetic disorder that affects the growth of 
brain fibers leading to death in its patients, mostly children before 
the age of ten. Through the efforts of some individuals, organizations, 
                                                                                                                    
 116. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 694 (N.J. 1967) (Francis, J., concurring) 
(originating the term “eugenic abortion”). “Eugenic abortion” refers to abortion intended 
solely to eliminate a potentially defective fetus and is used to differentiate that form of 
abortion from “therapeutic abortion” which is an abortion performed to protect a woman’s 
health. See Hummel v. Reiss, 608 A.2d 1341, 1343 (N.J. 1992) (citing lower court opinion 
defining “eugenic abortion” versus “therapeutic abortion”). 
 117. See Howard v. Lecher, 366 N.E.2d 64, 65 (1977) (holding parents were not entitled 
to recovery against doctor for his failure to warn them of the high risk that their child 
would suffer from Tay-Sachs disease). 
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and researchers and their related organizations, a genetic test has 
been developed allowing for the screening of prospective parents, 
embryos, and fetuses. The lawsuit, Greenberg v. Miami Children’s 
Research Institute, Inc.,118 involves a dispute between the parents of 
children who either died from or have Canavan Disease and their or-
ganizational supporters, and the researcher who discovered the “Ca-
navan gene” and the holder of the patent for the gene and the related 
genetic tests.119 The underlying issue is that the holder of the patent, 
the research organization, threatened the organizational plaintiff’s 
goal of virtually free screening for one of the groups most severely af-
fected by the disease—Ashkenazim or persons of East European Jew-
ish descent—when it insisted upon licensing fees to use its tests. 
 The essence of the plaintiffs’ complaint in Greenberg is that the 
researcher should have informed them of his intention to patent that 
gene, if discovered, when he took autopsy tissues of their dead chil-
dren, and blood and other sources of DNA from them and their rela-
tives. The plaintiffs further allege that they provided the seed money 
for the researcher’s foray into genetic medicine and access to poten-
tial donors of tissues. The defendants have argued that the complaint 
should be dismissed on a number of grounds. 
 Since the question still remains whether the plaintiffs have stated 
a cause of action, I have argued that a proper reading of Moore v. Re-
gents of the University of California,120 where the California Supreme 
Court held there was a fiduciary duty on the part of a physician to 
disclose both his research and pecuniary interests in a patient’s 
DNA, should lead to the plaintiffs’ surviving the motion to dismiss or 
a motion for summary judgment.121 The result of such a ruling is that 
the lack of informed consent doctrine in genetic health cases protects 
the rights of groups of individuals to participate in the dissemination 
of genetic knowledge. 
 Essentially, I am arguing that individuals, with the obvious sup-
port of organizations, have the legal right to prevent the birth of a 
child with what they consider a disability. The issue then is: Does 
supporting this right to eliminate disability through genetic testing 
and selective abortion or destruction of embryos increase the likeli-
hood of stigmatization of the disabled? The answer is “yes,” but it 
needs to be qualified by the following observations. 
 First, the individuals who might be afflicted with Canavan Dis-
ease are now socially linked either through genetic knowledge or 
                                                                                                                    
 118. 208 F. Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. Ill. 2002). The United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, has recently transferred the case to the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Id. at 928-29.  
 119. The Canavan Disease case is described in detail in Palmer, supra note 7, at 8-13.  
 120. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
 121. Id. at 498. 
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their own ethnic and religious self-definition. The social definition 
might lead to less drastic means of avoiding the risk of disability by 
advising against having children between two prospective parents 
with a high risk of creating a child with Canavan. Thus, a bit of 
counseling and discussion could decrease the incidents of “eugenic 
abortion.” 
 Second, in an ethical sense, abortion is preferable in my view to 
even voluntary sterilization to avoid disability. I make this point of a 
continuum from contraception, to abortion, to sterilization because 
the most important eugenic precedent in this country is Buck v. 
Bell,122 which has never been overruled.123 Political institutions in 
this country still have the theoretical right to use scientific knowl-
edge to eliminate the disabled. But we should not confuse the author-
ity of political institutions with the legal and ethical rights of indi-
viduals to form families in accordance with their own values, includ-
ing their views of genetic risks.124 
V.    CONCLUSION 
 Given this lack of constitutional prohibition against sterilization 
of the supposedly genetically unfit, I suggest that the legal efforts to 
prevent the abuse of genetic knowledge in pursuit of genetic health 
must take place in other forums: legislatures and liability doctrine 
development. We can use the Tuskegee Syphilis Study and the 
“crimes against humanity” portion of the Nazi Doctors Case as guide-
lines for legal developments. At the moment, courts could use these 
guidelines in disease management cases to allow private individuals 
to exercise some control over genetics-oriented physicians/scientists. 
These processes of liability can be used to optimize the risks and 
benefits of the use of genetic knowledge. 
 On the legislative front, the tortured history of sickle cell ane-
mia125 should remind us that legislatures may not be good social 
optimizers of the risks and benefits of genetic knowledge. We should 
                                                                                                                    
 122. 247 U.S. 200 (1927); see also supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 123. However, it has been almost entirely repudiated.  See, e.g., Fieger v. Thompson, 74 
F.2d 740, 750 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 124. This explains why I believe it is better to view the woman’s constitutional right to 
abortion as part of family formation instead of a “right” of privacy or autonomy. See 
PALMER, supra note 25, at 19-37; Palmer, supra note 64, at 167-73. 
 125. Screening for carriers of the disease began in the United States in the 1970s. The 
majority of programs were voluntary; however, a few states enacted legislation requiring 
screening for those with sickle cell anemia and the sickle cell trait. Congress passed the 
National Sickle Cell Anemia Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-294, 86 Stat. 136, which 
provided funding for research and education. The act prompted many states to reverse 
their earlier call for mandatory screening.  This act was then revised, updated, and re-
named the National Sickle Cell Anemia, Cooley’s Anemia, Tay-Sachs, and Genetic Dis-
eases Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-278, 90 Stat. 407; see James E. Bowman, Genetics and Afri-
can Americans, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 919 (1997).  
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try to encourage a political agenda based on voluntary rather than 
mandatory participation in screening programs and resist attempts 
to immunize physicians/scientists from liability for failure to share 
genetic knowledge in hindsight adjudication.126 There is some risk 
that the private market could exploit consumers/patients, but we 
should not allow our fears to prevent us from seeing that there is a 
separate but linked issue, that of equal access to health care. No 
matter how “good” our motives or intentions, we could adversely af-
fect equal access to health care by trying to stop the attempt to 
eliminate genetic disability. To do so would be yet another example of 
“good” people creating “bad” systematic responses.  
 I hope that we will strengthen other social institutions, such as 
the family, to cope with the prospect of genetic disease management 
as we attempt to understand what is meant by “genetic health” for 
ourselves and for future generations.  
 
                                                                                                                    
 126. The current “malpractice crisis” in some states has caused organized medicine to 
put “tort liability” back on its political agenda. See Peggy Peck, AMA Declares War on Mal-
practice Crisis (June 26, 2002), at http://my.webmd.com/content/article/1691.51255 (last 
visited Aug. 7, 2002) (on file with author). Whether there is in fact a liability crisis is, of 
course, subject to debate as it has been in previous so-called malpractice crises in the 1970s 
and 1980s. 
